

SPANHAUS

THE **SPAMHAUS** PROJECT

ICANN 38 BRUSSELS



About The Spamhaus Project

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 DROP



Over

1,500,000,000

mailboxes protected using our data



Fast flux

15 new locations. Every few minutes.



Traditional bullet-proof hosting

- Site resolves to a single IP address



Fast flux bullet-proof hosting

- Multiple IP addresses act as a proxy for a conceiled website



Fast flux bullet-proof hosting


- Multiple IP addresses can also answer for the hidden nameservers of a domain
- This means that abuse mitigation has been moved from the hosting company to the registrar registrars were never intended to handle this scenario



Hosting the worst of the worst


- Phishing websites (Zeus/Avalanche specifically)
- ···· Mule scams
- ----- Malware downloads






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Domain Block List

- Usable in any content filter that can check domains against a DNSBL



Main goals

- Provide additional protection against spam that passes IP-based DNSBLs
- Shorten the usable lifespan of spammer controlled domains
- Zero false positives



What is the input for the DBL?

- And some IP addresses as well



And then?

- DBL engine processes each domain to calculate reputation
- New zone is built and distributed to worldwide users every minute



What ends up in the zone?

- Used for spam, phishing or malware distribution
- These domains will have either been used in spamvertized URLs or as nameservers, redirectors, reverse DNS, etc.



Usage in mail filtering

- Extract domain from mailbody or headers



Some lessons learned (1)

- The big 'Ruskranian' spam operations use new domains every few minutes
- So, they consider domains a throw-away resource!
- Makes them very different from regular customers, who tend to be in it for the long run



Some lessons learned (2)

- Some spammers 'age' domains: domains are not always used directly after registration
- Aging can be weeks or months, periods of over a year have been seen in the wild



Some lessons learned (3)

- Who considers rogoxxywtrcwph.info to be a legit domain?



Some lessons learned (4)

- Speaking of hiding... whois privacy protection is still strongly associated with badness



Some lessons learned (5)

- Some registrars have over 90% of their sponsored domains listed
- We doubt the legitimacy of these kind of 'registrars'



Thank you!

Our team is happy to answer questions either now or after the event!